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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DALE RYAN McGRATH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950230-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. CORRECTION OF ERRATA. 
At p.7 n.l, the State incorrectly states that Mr. Ricks 
pled guilty to one count of robbery. Mr. Ricks actually pled 
guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
See Addendum B in appellant's opening brief. 
At p. 23, the State asserts that Mr. Ricks was not 
interrogated until some 20 to 30 hours after his arrest. The page 
cited, R. 24 8, involves the trial court saying "Well, there was--
there was a confession some 20, 30 hours later." The trial court 
is not a witness, and was doubtless not present at Mr. Ricks' 
interrogation. In fact, Mr. Ricks was interrogated no later than 
8 hours after his arrest. R. 150 (Mr. Ricks testifies he was 
interviewed the next day); see also addendum A (waiver of rights 
form signed 3/22/93 at 1:09 P.M.; p. 20 of unofficial preliminary 
hearing transcript where Officer Glover indicates his recollection 
that he interrogated Mr. Ricks the morning after his arrest; police 
report indicating that Officers Glover and Garner spoke with Mr. 
Ricks on 3/22/93 and he signed a waiver at that time).1 
POINT II. THE STATE HAS MISREPRESENTED THE HOLDING 
IN BROWN V. ILLINOIS. 
(Responding to State's brief at p. 15 and 22 n.8) 
The State asserts that in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Supreme Court "did 
not hold that the taint of the illegal arrest had not been purged, 
merely that the Illinois courts 'were in error in assuming that the 
xThese documents are not part of the record on appeal. Given 
the State's action in making this an issue, appellant would request 
that the court take judicial notice of these official police 
documents for the limited purposes set forth here. 
2 
Miranda warnings, by themselves, . . . always purge the taint of an 
illegal arrest.' Id. at 605." This assertion completely 
misrepresents the holding in Brown. Elsewhere in the opinion the 
court states: 
Although the Illinois courts failed to 
undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun to evaluate 
the circumstances of this case in the light of the policy 
served by the exclusionary rule, the trial resulted in a 
record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which 
the determination may be made. We therefore decline the 
suggestion of the United States, as amicus curiae, see 
Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 
L.Ed.2d 299 (1969), to remand the case for further 
factual findings. We conclude that the State failed to 
sustain the burden of showing that the evidence in 
question was admissible under Wong Sun. 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427-8 
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court squarely held that under the 
facts presented in Brown, attenuation could not be shown. Under 
similarly egregious facts here, attenuation is likewise not 
present. 
POINT III. MR. RICKS' TESTIMONY WAS UNATTENUATED 
FROM THE ILLEGAL TRAFFIC STOP. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point One, pp. 11-
26) 
A. CASES CITED BY THE STATE ON THE ISSUE OF 
FREE WILL ARE DISTINGUISHABLE IN THAT 
THEY DO NOT CONCERN "FOUND" WITNESSES, AS 
HERE. 
Cases relied on by the State are distinguishable. In 
United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 752-3 (2nd Cir. 1980), 
cited in State's brief at 18, appellant sought to suppress the 
testimony of unindicted co-conspirator Samuel Ax. Mr. Ax's drivers 
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license and social security card were found during an illegal 
search of a motel room. Unlike the present case, the police were 
already aware of Ax and his potential complicity: 
First, Ax's existence, identity and potential 
value as a witness were established prior to the seizure 
of Berland's tackle box. Leonardi had already inculpated 
Ax by name and description, and the discovery of Ax's 
driver's license among the effects of his accomplice did 
little more than corroborate that information. The 
license was in no way used to locate or apprehend Ax; in 
short, he was not a "found" witness whose existence 
became known to the authorities only as a consequence of 
the illicit search. Cf. United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 
956 (D.C.Cir.1978). 
Second, the evidence so obtained did not, in 
itself, implicate Ax in any criminal wrongdoing, much 
less armed bank robbery. Indeed, the driver's license 
and social security card were meaningless in the absence 
of other evidence except to suggest association between 
Berland and Ax. 
Leonardi, 623 F.2d at 652. Here, police were unaware of Mr. Ricks' 
identity and complicity until he was "found" as part of the illegal 
traffic stop. The bulk of Leonardi is not on point. 
Interestingly, some language in Leonardi bears directly on the 
present case: 
[T] o hold that Ax's later decision to enter a plea 
arrangement which called for his testimony as a 
government witness was separable from his initial 
confession and represented a distinct act of volition is 
somewhat unrealistic and artificial. 
623 F.2d at 753. So here, Mr. Ricks' decision to plead guilty is 
inseparable from his original confession, obtained through direct 
exploitation of the illegal traffic stop. To the limited extent 
Leonardi is applicable to this case, it supports Mr. McGrath's 
position. 
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United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980) , 
also involved a witness whose identity was discovered through 
other, legal means. An "M. D. Holt" had been the recipient of one 
or more telephone calls from Brookins1 tnotel room, and the police 
obtained an address and referred the matter to Nashville police who 
followed up on the lead. 614 F.2d at 104 0. At a subsequent 
illegal interrogation, Brookins revealed the identity of 
prosecution witness Carlton Holt. The trial court found that 
routine investigation would inevitably lead to the discovery of 
Carlton Holt. 614 F.2d at 1048-9. Here, police had no independent 
leads that would result in the discovery of Mr. Ricks, a "found" 
witness• 
United States v. Stevens, 612 f. 2d 1226 (10th Cir. 1979), 
cert, denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980), also involved a witness who was 
not a "found" witness: 
Ruling upon a pretrial motion to exclude Deal's 
proposed testimony against Stevens, the court held it was 
admissible 
on the ground that Deal's identity and his illegal 
narcotics dealings were known to law enforcement 
officers prior to the illegal wiretaps and further, 
and of even greater significance, Deal's statement 
to law enforcement officers and his decision to 
plead guilty and to testify against his 
co-defendants were wholly independent of the 
illegal wiretaps. 
Steven!./ 612 F.2& at 1223. ¥or the sBrtfte reasons as the above 
cases, Stevens does not assist the inquiry here. 
In United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 
1967), the police were also aware of the existence of (though not 
the identity of) a complained of witness- The court did find that 
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this witness's decision to plead guilty purged his testimony of any 
taint, and there was no exploitation of the illegal arrest. Here, 
Mr. Ricks was a "found" witness. Absent the illegal traffic stop, 
the police never would have located him and obtained the benefit of 
his testimony. 
The State relies on a single sentence in a footnote of 
People v. Steeg, 258 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 n.2 (Cal. App. 1989) (where, 
as here, an accomplice on advice of counsel elects to accept a plea 
bargain and testify against his former codefendants, that testimony 
is not subject to exclusion if it is later determined that the 
accomplice was arrested or detained illegally). The Steeg opinion 
fails to offer much in the way of facts or analysis. The opinion 
in the case of codefendant Williams, People v. Williams, 756 P.2d 
221 (Cal. 1988) is far more helpful.2 The California Supreme Court 
found: 
defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the 
evidence was tainted by the unlawful police entry into 
room 28. We seriously doubt he even succeeded in making 
the requisite showing that but for the primary illegality 
the evidence would not have been obtained. Specifically, 
he introduced scant evidence to show that in the absence 
of the unlawful entry the police would not have lawfully 
seized Finckel; indeed, the officers had Finckel's 
description, were at his door, and had information 
sufficient to warrant at least an investigative stop. 
Moreover, defendant presented little if any evidence to 
demonstrate that without the unlawful entry Finckel would 
not have talked to the police or agreed to testify for 
the prosecution; on the contrary, from the very beginning 
Finckel voluntarily cooperated with the authorities . . . 
2Both Steeg and Williams joined in a single motion to 
suppress. 258 Cal. Rptr. at 91 ("Because Steeg joined in Williams' 
motion, the facts and procedural background in the two cases are 
identical.") . 
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People v. Williams, 756 P.2d at 240-1. Finckel was not a "found" 
witness, as in the case at bar. The California Supreme Court found 
that there was no taint; the court of appeals discussion of 
attenuation seems most misplaced, in light of the absence of any 
taint. Steeg does not materially assist the State. 
State v. Kent, 391 So.2d 429 (La. 1980) is the only case 
that legitimately supports the State!s position. However, Kent 
rests on a violation of a Louisiana precedent which holds "that the 
confession of a juvenile is absolutely inadmissible unless the 
prosecution shows that the juvenile engaged in a meaningful 
consultation with an attorney or an informed parent, guardian, or 
other interested adult before waiving constitutional rights." 391 
So.2d at 431. The court failed to address whether derivative 
evidence discovered under such a non-constitutional dimension 
violation is suppressible at all, and proceeded to apply an 
attenuation analysis. Cases relied on by appellant are better 
reasoned, do not rest on a quirk of Louisiana law, and compel 
suppression here. 
People v. McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1978), is not 
remotely similar to the instant case. McGrath, after receiving a 
grant of transactional immunity, was held in criminal contempt for 
testifying with answers that were "evasive, equivocal and patently 
false, such that they amounted to no answers at all." 385 N.E.2d 
at 545. The questions were premised on information gleaned from an 
illegal wiretap. The court held that McGrath's contumacious 
testimony was a sufficient act of free will to purge any taint 
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flowing from the illegal wiretaps. Although respondents' 
appearances before the Grand Jury must be viewed as causally 
related to the illegal wiretaps, their voluntary and deliberate 
acts in choosing to testify falsely and evasively before that body 
furnished vitally independent links in the chain of causation." 
385 N.E.2d at 549. The instant case bears no similarity at all to 
McGrath, save perhaps a shared surname. 
The opinion in People v. Burnie, 624 N.Y.S.2d 463 (App. 
Div. 1995) , all 207 words of it, is so devoid of meaningful 
reasoning as to be useless. 
The State appears to be making the argument that the 
intervening decision of a witness to plead guilty acts as a per se 
intervening circumstance. This is precisely the type of argument 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois (rejecting 
contention that Miranda warnings act as a per se intervening 
circumstance). Each case must be decided on its own facts. 
Staring down the barrel of two five to life sentences, Mr. Ricks 
cannot be said to have acted of his own free will. 
B. POLICE USED THE FRUITS OF THE ILLEGAL 
STOP IN QUESTIONING MR. RICKS. 
The State dances delicately around the issue of use of 
actual physical evidence in questioning Ricks by stating that it is 
unaware of any record cites indicating that such evidence was used 
in questioning. As Officer Glover's police report at p. 2, see 
8 
addendum A, makes clear, Mr. Ricks was confronted with a two dollar 
bill found in his possession.3 
The State rejects out of hand the contention that 
knowledge obtained in the course of police illegality is a fruit of 
that illegality. According to the State, unless the police 
actually pull out the robbery proceeds and confront Mr. Ricks with 
them, the police have not used evidence during the questioning. 
This is nonsense. The State has lost sight of the forest for the 
trees. 
The inquiry we are making is whether Mr. Ricks' 
statements were obtained through exploitation of the illegal 
traffic stop. Certainly, robbery proceeds may be exploited 
directly. Likewise, the information that Mr. Ricks was in 
possession of robbery proceeds may be exploited. The police need 
not say anything; being caught red handed is sufficient to exert 
considerable pressure. The child with his hand in the cookie jar 
does not need to have the cookie jar expressly pointed out and 
referred to in order to understand that he's in serious trouble. 
Here, the interrogation of Mr. McGrath was focused and 
directed by what was obtained during the traffic stop: (1) Mr. 
Ricks' identity; and (2) robbery proceeds. This evidence was used 
3As in many cases, the record here is not perfect. Both sides 
could and should have offered additional evidence. Though 
technically evidence concerning the two dollar bill is not before 
the court, the court should nevertheless consider its obligation to 
see that justice is done. As strenuously as the State argues that 
it should not be penalized for the blunders of the constable, 
counsel would argue that defendants should not be penalized for the 
blunders of their counsel. The true facts here, despite absence of 
record cites, are that evidence was used in questioning Mr. Ricks. 
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implicitly but directly. This factor weighs in favor of 
suppression. 
C. THE POLICE WERE LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE. 
The State asserts that this is not a case "where the 
police 'embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that 
something might turn up1." This contention falls of its own 
weight. Officer Dwyer testified that he was interested in 
appellant as a possible aggravated robbery suspect, and stopped the 
car to pursue that hunch. R. 203, 207-8, 210, 212. 
The stop of appellant's vehicle by activation of the 
police cruiser's overhead lights can only be described as flagrant. 
While not committed in bad faith, the action was nevertheless 
deliberate and intentional. We are not dealing with a mere 
oversight like failing to give complete Miranda warnings. 
Finally, there is nothing "laudable" about an illegal 
traffic stop. True, we want police to develop hunches and 
investigate based on them, but they must do so within the confines 
of the law. This factor favors suppression. 
D. TEMPORAL PROXIMITY FAVORS SUPPRESSION. 
As set forth in Point I, supra at p. 2, the State has 
incorrectly asserted that Mr. Ricks was not interrogated until some 
20 to 3 0 hours after his arrest, when in fact he was interrogated 
approximately 8 hours thereafter. 
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Appellant fully addressed the remaining aspects of this 
issue in his opening brief at Point I.B.3 (pp.19-20) and Point III 
(pp. 22-5) . 
E. CASES CITED BY APPELLANT ARE ON POINT. 
At p. 24 n.10, the State does a cursory job of attempting 
to distinguish the cases principally relied on by appellant. These 
cases are on point, and mandate suppression here. 
The State seeks to distinguish United States v. Cruz, 581 
F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), by pointing out that the 
suspects there were questioned at the scene of the arrest. 
Respectfully, this is a distinction without a difference. The 
eight hour delay prior to questioning did not make Mr. Ricks' 
interrogation any less the product of the illegal traffic stop.4 
Cruz is on all fours. 
The State seeks to distinguish United States v. Scios, 
590 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc), on the basis that the 
witness there was threatened with contempt. Here, Mr. Ricks was 
facing two first degree felonies with prison terms of five years to 
life each. Mr. Ricks' decision to testify was even more coerced 
than the witness in Scios. This case is on all fours. 
The State's criticism of State v. Bravo. 762 P.2d 1318 
(Ariz. 1988), has a grain of truth in that the court does not 
4It should be noted that incarceration frequently makes 
tongues looser -- after a period of being locked up, detainees are 
more likely to try anything to get out, including full and open 
confessions. 
11 
address whether suppression of the fruits of a Miranda violation, 
as distinguished from a constitutional violation, are properly 
suppressible.5 The remainder of the Bravo court's reasoning is 
sound, however, and compels suppression here. The Bravo court did 
not adopt a "but-for" test; instead, the court applied a complete 
and proper attenuation analysis and found that there was 
insufficient attenuation to allow the testimony to be admitted. 
The cases relied on by appellant are all on point and 
compel suppression here. 
POINT IV. MR. RICKS1 TESTIMONY IS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point Two, pp. 27-
29) 
A. THE STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY THEORY 
IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The State asserts that, "Without any misconduct, Sergeant 
Dwyer's suspicions would have caused him to follow defendant's 
truck, note its license plate number, and request a warrants 
check." State's brief at 28. The State provides no record 
5The State is quick to criticize the Bravo court, yet it 
relies on a similar case. State v. Kent, 391 So.2d 429 (La. 1981), 
addressed a witness discovered through a confession of a juvenile 
invalid under a Louisiana decision which holds "that the confession 
of a juvenile is absolutely inadmissible unless the prosecution 
shows that the juvenile engaged in a meaningful consultation with 
an attorney or an informed parent, guardian, or other interested 
adult before waiving constitutional rights." 391 So.2d at 431. 
The court failed to address whether derivative evidence discovered 
under such a non-constitutional dimension violation is suppressible 
at all, and proceeded to apply an attenuation analysis. 
The State evidently has no problem relying on such cases 
where the result, unlike Bravo, supports its position. 
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citations in support of this contention. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) (requiring citations to the record in support of 
arguments). This contention is not supported by the record, much 
less proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
At the initial suppression hearing, Officer Dwyer was 
asked what he would have done if he were unaware of the robberies, 
but saw defendant's vehicle. He responded that "I would have 
stopped the vehicle. Perhaps followed it further and got a more 
definite speed and I would have stopped the vehicle, obtained 
licenses, run the individuals for wants and warrants, issued a 
citation and let them go." R. 207. At no point did Officer Dwyer 
testify concerning radioing in for the registered owner of the 
vehicle, and running a wants and warrants check on that registered 
owner, without stopping the vehicle. The theory now advanced by 
the State is unsupported by the evidence, and must be rejected. 
The State has failed to meet its burden of proving inevitable 
discovery by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. at 444 ("If the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or 
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means--here the 
volunteers' search--then the deterrence rationale has so little 
basis that the evidence should be received."). 
The State fares no better if it changes its theory to one 
where Officer Dwyer would have pulled appellant over for a future 
violation. At the initial suppression hearing, the trial court 
determined that there was no violation allowing Officer Dwyer to 
13 
pull Mr. McGrath over. The State failed to appeal that 
determination. Any theory premised on pulling Mr. McGrath for a 
future violation necessarily is premised on pure speculation. 
The inevitable discovery doctrine does not permit 
admission of tainted evidence to be premised on speculation. 
"[I]nevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but 
focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready 
verification or impeachment and does not require a departure from 
the usual burden of proof at suppression hearings." Williams, 467 
U.S. at 444 n.5. Any contention that Mr. McGrath would have 
committed a violation permitting Officer Dwyer to pull him over is 
speculative, and must be rejected. 
The State presents an alternate theory: 
Even if no stop had ever occurred, the truck's 
license plate number would have led police to defendant, 
and thence to his mother, whose statement would have 
implicated Ricks. His "numerous warrants" would have 
landed Ricks in jail, where police would have questioned 
him about the aggravated robberies. Ricks might or might 
not have been motivated by the plea bargain in connection 
with these robberies, but he would still have been 
motivated by some or all of the following: fear that 
defendant would turn state's evidence first, the pendency 
of "numerous" unrelated charges, a desire to help 
himself, and a desire to change his lifestyle. 
State's brief at 29. Once again, the State offers no record cites. 
There is no proof of "demonstrated historical facts capable of 
ready verification or impeachment" as Williams requires. The State 
is relying on pure speculation. 
First, there is no evidence that Mrs. McGrath would have 
remembered anything of the night in question had it not been for 
the fact that she received a call from her son in jail subsequent 
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to the illegal stop. This event, surely a startling and prominent 
event for any parent, fixed the events of that evening in her mind 
and are likely the only reason she remembers anything about that 
particular evening. 
Second, even if Mrs. McGrath remembered Mr. Ricks, and 
the police picked him up, this is fundamentally different than 
being apprehended with robbery proceeds. The police would only be 
likely to get the usual response of "I don't know 'nuthin'," in 
response to interrogation at that point. The State's speculation 
concerning possible motivations to confess to armed robberies is 
wholly unsupported by the record. Mr. Ricks was called as a 
witness at the suppression hearing. R. 139-154. Certainly, the 
State could have asked Mr. Ricks while he was on the stand to 
testify concerning whether he feared that appellant would turn 
State's evidence, whether other pending charges would have induced 
him to confess to other offenses,6 whether he had a desire to help 
himself,7 and whether he had a desire to change his lifestyle.8 Any 
6This contention is ludicrous. "Well, they probably have me 
on a 1 to 15, so I might as well ' f ess up and get a couple 5 to 
lifes with enhancements in addition." This simply does not occur, 
and the State has not shown by a preponderance that it would have 
occurred here. 
Confessing to crimes is not helpful to the confessor. 
Confessing to additional crimes does not result overall in a better 
plea bargain. Mr. Ricks' case proves the point. Originally faced 
with 4 second degree felonies, carrying a maximum term of 15 years, 
he pled guilty to a first degree felony carrying a sentence of up 
to life imprisonment. From his perspective, this was hardly 
beneficial for him. 
8As an aside, Mr. Ricks' probation revocation on May 19, 1995, 
see docket for case No. 931900518 FS, is strongly suggestive of the 
(continued...) 
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evidence concerning Mr. Ricks' true motivations is entirely lacking 
as a direct result of the State's failure to inquire. The State's 
fantasized motivations, raised for the first time on appeal, must 
be rejected as speculation. 
The single case relied on by the State, State v. Hoffman, 
385 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1967), is not helpful. In Hoffman, 
prior to the illegal arrests which revealed the true identities of 
the suspects, "the existence of these persons, their association 
together, and the fact that some stolen money orders had been left 
behind in the motel room occupied by one of them, were facts which 
became known apart from the arrests and unlawful search and 
seizure." 385 F.2d at 503. This case is distinguishable. Here, 
Mr. Ricks' identity and possible complicity in the armed robberies 
was entirely unknown to the police and only discovered as a result 
of the unlawful stop of appellant's vehicle. 
The State failed to prove inevitable discovery by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and that doctrine thus fails to 
provide a basis for the admissibility of Mr. Ricks' testimony. 
B, THE STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY THEORY 
EVISCERATES THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, AND IS 
UNSUPPORTED BY CASE LAW. 
Absent any evidence to support its theory, the State's 
basic premise is that Officer Dwyer could have checked the vehicle 
8(...continued) 
fact that Mr. Ricks has not changed his lifestyle much, if at all. 
Mr. Ricks has been sent to prison. See id. 
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registration, found outstanding warrants on the registered owner, 
and stopped the vehicle, all of which would have been legal. Under 
the inevitable discovery doctrine, however, the State is obligated 
to prove that Officer Dwyer would have followed a legal course of 
action in stopping the vehicle and discovering both the identity of 
Mr. Ricks and the robbery proceeds. The very facts of this case 
disprove any such contention. As conclusively determined at the 
first suppression hearing, Officer Dwyer conducted an illegal 
traffic stop, not premised on reasonable articulable suspicion. 
The facts here prove that Officer Dwyer would conduct an illegal 
stop, and would not proceed by legal means. Under settled Utah 
law, "the prosecution must show that the evidence !would' have been 
discovered, not simply that it 'could1 or 'might' have been 
discovered. State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923 n.8 (Utah App. 
1995) (citing State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Or. 1985)); 
accord United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 842 (1st Cir. 1983) 
("[T]he exclusionary rule is not aborted whenever the government 
can show that illegally obtained evidence could have been lawfully 
obtained. . . . The rule is aimed more at the unlawful conduct 
than at the lawful availability or unavailability of the 
evidence."). 
In Williams, the Supreme Court provided only minimal 
guidelines on application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
First, the court held that the burden is on the prosecution to 
prove inevitable discovery by a preponderance of the evidence. 467 
U.S. at 444. The sole remaining guidance comes in footnote 5, 
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where the court notes that "inevitable discovery involves no 
speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts 
capable of ready verification or impeachment and does not require 
a departure from the usual burden of proof at suppression 
hearings." 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. 
Courts applying the inevitable discovery doctrine have 
developed varying standards for its application. Some courts have 
required that an independent investigation be ongoing at the time 
of the police misconduct. E.g. United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 
1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (necessary to show "that the police also 
prior to the misconduct were actively pursuing the alternate line 
of investigation"), United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 
(11th Cir. 1984) 1984) ("if evidence is obtained by illegal 
conduct, the illegality can be cured only if the police possessed 
and were pursuing a lawful means of discovery at the time the 
illegality occurred, [cites omitted] The Government cannot later 
initiate a lawful avenue of obtaining the evidence and then claim 
that it should be admitted because its discovery was'inevitable.") , 
United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 152 (10th Cir. 1986) 
("Clearly these officers were not conducting an independent 
investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the cocaine."), 
see also United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 
1982) (danger of "admitting unlawfully obtained evidence 'on the 
strength of some judge's speculation that it would have been 
discovered legally anyway,' . . . is diminished when, as here, the 
evidence clearly would have been discovered within a short time 
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through a lawful investigation already underway."). Here the 
police were not pursuing a lawful means of discovery at the time of 
the illegal traffic stop. 
Other courts have declined to require an ongoing, 
independent investigation, but these courts still require a more 
rigorous showing than that proposed by the State. In United States 
v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 1986), the court made a 
three part inquiry: 
are the legal means truly independent; are both the use 
of the legal means and the discovery by that means truly 
inevitable; and does the application of the inevitable 
discovery exception either provide an incentive for 
police misconduct or significantly weaken fourth 
amendment protection? 
Under this inquiry, the inevitable discovery doctrine is 
inapplicable to the facts at hand. The State's proposed theories 
are not independent. All involve Officer Dwyer, and rely on 
information he obtained just prior to and during the illegal stop. 
In terms of inevitability, no testimony was presented concerning 
departmental policy concerning investigating license plates to 
obtain wants and warrants, nor did Officer Dwyer testify concerning 
any individual policy he had. Officer Dwyer did not even testify 
that if he thought he had insufficient reasonable suspicion to stop 
appellant's vehicle, he would have run a check on the license plate 
and attempted to determine if there were any wants or warrants on 
the registered owner. All the State offers is speculation, devoid 
of the "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification 
or impeachment" required by Williams. The final factor, police 
incentives, militates against application of the inevitable 
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discovery doctrine here. The only way to effectively deter 
unlawful traffic stops such as occurred here, is to suppress both 
the primary fruits and derivative fruits of those seizures. 
People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536 (N.Y. 1981), is 
instructive: 
The People do not suggest any other means by which they 
would have gained possession of the contraband in 
question except for the by now tainted search of the 
bedroom and basement. Once so flawed, it could not be 
reincarnated as a hypothetical untainted one. Were the 
rule otherwise, every warrantless nonexigent seizure 
automatically would be legitimatized by assuming the 
hypothetical alternative that a warrant had been 
obtained. Without the deterr[]ent effect of the 
exclusionary rule, in such circumstances the 
constitutional warrant procedure shielding Americans from 
unreasonable searches and seizures would be a shambles. 
We are not here now to address whether Officer Dwyer could have 
conducted himself lawfully and obtained sufficient information to 
warrant a stop of appellant's vehicle. The simple truth is he did 
not. The State has not proved that Mr. Ricks' identity and 
complicity in the robberies would have inevitably been discovered. 
As a result, derivative evidence, including the testimony of Mr. 
Ricks, must be suppressed. 
People v. Turriacrof 644 N.Y.S.2d 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996), like the present case, involved a post hoc rationalization 
for how the police could have proceeded (but did not) in a 
constitutional fashion. In Turriacro, a vehicle was stopped for 
speeding. Prior to verifying the veracity of the driver's license 
or registration, the trooper asked for consent to search based on 
mere curiosity and the fact that it was the first day of hunting 
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season. Consent to search was granted and revealed a homicide 
victim. The court held that the request for consent was not 
premised on reasonable articulable suspicion. Addressing the 
prosecution's inevitable discovery argument, the court stated: 
Finally, there is no merit to the People's 
bootstrap argument that, irrespective of the lack of 
legal predicate for the search of the vehicle, the body 
of Fernando Cuervo would inevitably have been discovered 
[ ] . It is the People's contention that the police were 
bound to learn, as ultimately they did, that none of the 
three men had a valid operator's permit to drive the van. 
Therefore, they assert, the vehicle was required to have 
been impounded [ ] and would have been subject to an 
inventory search. Overlooking, for the time being, the 
infirmity of this reasoning, it must be emphasized that, 
while the State Troopers properly obtained the vehicle 
registration and the operator's license [ ], the record 
indicates that they made no attempt to verify the 
documentation before proceeding to seek defendant's 
permission to search it [ ] . This sequence of events 
only lends further support to the conclusion that the 
search "was the product of an inseparable illegal 
detention" [ ] . 
In any event, the law on this subject is 
settled. "The doctrine of inevitable discovery may not 
be used to excuse unlawful police actions by admitting 
what was obtained as a direct result of the misconduct" 
[ ] . . . . We hold that applying the inevitable 
discovery rule in these circumstances, and effecting what 
would amount to a post hoc rationalization of the initial 
wrong [ ] , would be an unacceptable dilution of the 
exclusionary rule." 
Turriacro, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 183. For identical reasons, the 
inevitable discovery rule is inapplicable here. Post hoc 
rationalizations are too easily concocted, and obliterate the 
necessary deterrent function of the exclusionary rule. It is 
always possible for the police to act within constitutional bounds. 
Their failure to do so necessitates that the exclusionary rule be 
given full effect. 
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The State cites no cases where, under facts similar to 
those here, a court has held the inevitable discovery rule to be 
applicable. Application of the rule here would severely undermine 
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and is not warranted. 
POINT V. APPELLANT'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
CONCERNING THE PROPER ATTENUATION STANDARD IS 
PRESERVED FOR REVIEW. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point Three, pp. 
30-31) 
The State asserts that appellant's claim that Utah should 
apply the same attenuation analysis for live witness testimony as 
for physical evidence is not preserved. This is not so. In the 
trial court, counsel for Mr. McGrath cited State v. Arroyo. 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), for the test that should apply in this case, 
to live witness testimony. R. 168-72. Arroyo neither sets forth 
a more stringent test for suppression of live witness testimony, 
nor cites any case that sets forth a more stringent test. The 
State neither cited Ceccolini or any other case setting forth a 
more stringent test, nor argued that a more stringent test should 
apply. Defense counsel plainly argued that in this case, involving 
live witness testimony, the normal attenuation test should apply. 
This, coupled with her invocation of article I, section 14, R. 163, 
preserves this issue for review: 
[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged error 
must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial 
court. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial 
court to correct any error, if error there be. 
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Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) (footnote 
omitted). See also Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 
1989); Bundy v. Century Equip. Co. , 692 P.2D 754, 758 (Utah 1984); 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 
672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 
1987). 
The only argument presented to the trial court was that 
the normal, rather than a more restrictive, attenuation test should 
apply. Ceccolini and its progeny were not raised by either party. 
The trial court necessarily considered Mr. McGrath's claims under 
that test. This issue is preserved. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and Mr. McGrath's opening brief, 
it is respectfully requested that this court reverse the denial of 
Mr. McGrath's suppression motion, and remand the case for 
withdrawal of his plea and further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /b day of August, 1996. 
X^#—-
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Waiver form, preliminary hearing testimony, and Glover's 
police report. 





Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. 
Your have the right to remain silent. 
Anything you say can be used against you in court. 
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to 
have him with you during questioning. 
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning 
if you wish. 
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the 
right toxtop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time 
until you talk to a lawyer. 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS 
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing 
to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I under-
stand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made TO me and no 
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PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
November 18, 1993 
STATE OF UTAH V. DALE MC GRATH 
CASE NUMBER: 931013303FS 
CHARGE: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1° 
DEFENSE: LISA J. REMAL 
PROSECUTOR: JIM COPE 
JUDGE: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
TAPE NUMBERS: T2428 & T2429 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED 
SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES 
FORMAL READING OF THE INFORMATION WAIVED 
Begin Tape T2428, beginning of Side B. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
COPE: Would you give us your full name? 
A: Richard Colin Andrus, A N D R U S. 
Q: Mr. Andrus, we want to talk about some things that 
happened on the 22nd day of March, 1993, very early in the morning. 
Could you tell the Court where you were during the very early 
morning hours of the 22nd of March, 1993? 
A: I was employed by Maverick Country Stores at 
approximately 5400 South 5600 West. 
Q: And you were working during that period of time between 
say 12:00 and 2:00 in the morning? 
A: I was working then. 
Q: Did anything unusual happen to you at that time? 
A: Yes. I was confronted by a, a, armed man who demanded 
that I go in the store and give him the money from the till. 
Q: With what was the man armed? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that he was arrested, a, at the time that the white 
truck Mr. McGrath was driving was stopped. 
A: That's true, that's true. 
Q: And in fact Mr. McGrath and Mr. Ricks were arrested at 








And, a, ultimately booked into the jail on ??? 
That's correct. 
For these offenses? 
That's correct. 
A, did you speak to Mr., a. Mr. Ricks there at the scene 
of his arrest or sometime later at the jail? 
A: Later. 
Q: All right. 
A: At the jail. 
Q: Within a few days of his arrest? 
A: The next morning I believe. 
Q: And I, a, presume you made a police report reflecting the 
contents or the summary of your conversation with Mr. Ricks, is 
that right? 
A: I did. 
Q: And that was one of the pieces of information that you 
presented to Mr. Cope when you screened the case back in March last 
year. 
A: The original case, yes. 
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